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Abstract 
The labour market for actors remains mostly unexplored. In this paper, we start by analysing 
how Hollywood wages have changed over time. We then proceed to examine the 
determinants of wages. One of our key findings is that there are substantial wage differences 
among male and female actors in Hollywood. A Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition suggests that 
45% of the differences in the gender-wage gap can be attributed to discrimination.  
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1. Introduction  
During the last decades, a substantial literature has emerged on the so-called Economics of 
Superstars, i.e. the economics of people that earn enormous amounts of money in comparison 
to their colleagues, dominating the field in which they participate (Rosen, 1981). This 
literature has shed light on wage inequality and talent distribution in several labour markets, 
including sports, music and finance (Franck and Nüesch, 2012; Ginsburgh and van Ours, 
2003; Krueger, 2005; Lucifora and Simmons, 2003). Interestingly, a labour market that has 
not been explored in this context so far is that for Hollywood actors.  
The lack of research in this area is unexpected for at least two reasons. First, the Hollywood 
movie industry employs more than 2 million workers per year, and is the largest of the 
creative industries - a sector that generates about 4 percent of the US GDP (National 
Endowment for the Arts and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012). Second, 
Hollywood constitutes an ideal example of the Superstar phenomenon: Hollywood stars 
comprise only a small fraction of the total number of Hollywood actors who appear in most 
of the movies released every year, and earn massively higher incomes than their peers even 
though, in some cases, differences in acting skills appear to be small (Terviö, 2011).  
The first aim of this paper is to fill the existing gap in the literature by analysing a 
comprehensive dataset on wages and their determinants obtained from IMDb and Box Office 
Mojo. We start our analysis by providing a pictorial representation of the long-run evolution 
of mean wages (adjusted for inflation). We show that, on average, Hollywood wages have 
been very high -consistent with the high incomes of the Superstar framework-, and display an 
upward trend throughout most of the twentieth century. We then proceed to explore the 
structure of wages. We find that the top 25 percent of actors earns between 50 and 80 percent 
of total wages, and that this fraction has decreased since the mid-1980s. Furthermore, by 
examining various measures of overall and upper tail wage inequality, we find that actors in 
the top 25 percent of the wage distribution earn about 5 times more than actors in the lower 
25 percent of the distribution.  
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The second contribution of this paper is to investigate the existence of gender wage 
differences and discrimination among Hollywood actors and actresses. A notable example, 
which has appeared widely on different media sources, is the movie American Hustle.
1
 For 
this movie, Christian Bale worked 45 days for $2.5 million upfront and 9% of total profits, 
Bradley Cooper worked 46 days for $2.5 million and 9% of total profits, while Amy Adams 
worked 45 days (same number of days as Christian Bale and just one day less than Bradley 
Cooper) and was paid $1.25 million and 7% of total profits. In her speech at the 2015 Oscars, 
Patricia Arquette expressed the growing discontent among actresses regarding gender wage 
differentials, and further comments followed from Meryl Streep, Charlize Theron, Jennifer 
Lawrence and Natalie Portman over the topic of ‘equal pay for equal job’.  
The research question of whether male actors are paid more than their female colleagues falls 
within the broader labour economics literature on gender wage differentials [see Blau and 
Kahn (2016) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016) for recent surveys]; and the non-negligible 
body of research that focuses on gender wage differentials among the highly paid (Bertrand 
and Hallock, 2001; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; Greg and Machin, 1993). Following 
previous studies, in this paper, we examine whether wages converge with actor’s years of 
experience by conducting a dynamic analysis of the gender gap in earnings (as in Bertrand et 
al., 2010). We also conduct a Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition to determine the 
unexplained differences in the gender wage gap that can be attributed to discrimination. 
Finally, we discuss factors that can contaminate our discrimination measure.  
 
2. Data  
The data employed in this study is obtained from two main sources and, for most of the 
analysis, span the period from 1980 to 2015. The primary dataset, which is formed by 
salaries, gender, year of birth, ethnicity, nationality, Oscar’s awards and nominations, is 
obtained from the biography section of the Internet Movie Database IMDb (www.imdb.com).
 
Actors’ salaries are composed of a fixed and a variable compensation. The latter, which is a 
contingent compensation, depends on the film’s final box office revenues, and the 
corresponding cash breakeven point specified in the actor’s contract (Caves, 2003; Epstein, 
2012). Because we observe variable compensation with substantial measurement error, we 
                                                          
1
 See for example: http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2016/03/amy-adams-american-hustle-pay-gap  
2
 IMDb is one of the most visited entertainment webpages across the word: 
https://www.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=imbd   
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focus (unless otherwise stated) on the fixed compensation part of salaries.  If anything, this 
implies that the reported estimates are biased towards zero, and thus our findings can be 
interpreted as conservative.
3
  
The second data source is Box Office Mojo (www.boxofficemojo.com) which provides 
detailed information on release date, studio, lifetime box office revenues, total number of 
theatres, box office revenues the opening weekend, number of opening theatres, and labour 
market experience in its “People/Actors” section, as well as genre classification, MPAA 
rating, distributor, and production budget in its “Movie” section.  
Descriptive statistics and variable definitions for the variables in our sample are presented in 
Table 1. The sample consists of 1,344 movie-actor pairs, a total of 267 different actors, where 
38% are female, 76% are US citizens, and 87% are white. Moreover, 16% have been 
nominated for an Oscar Academy award at least once, and 8% have won one or more Oscars 
for best leading character.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
In Table 1, we observe that most Hollywood movies, with the exception of those that gain 
positive word of mouth, earn their maximum box-office revenue in the first week of release. 
Gross box-office revenue in the opening weekend accounts for 26% of lifetime gross 
earnings, and the number of opening theatres constitutes 93% of the total lifetime number of 
theatres the movie will ever be shown at. The majority of movies in our sample, 70%, are 
distributed by the six big studios. These studios include Buena Vista, Twentieth Century Fox, 
Universal, Warner Brothers, Paramount and Sony-Columbia. The studio and distributor 
dummy coincides in this paper. The reason for this is that movies are high risk products with 
high costs of production and uncertainty of success previous to the release. Vertical 
integration in the film industry exists as a way of minimizing this risk. Producers and 
distributors for a specific movie belong to the same multinational or holding company as 
happens in other double sided and high risk markets such as that of Videogames (Gil and 
Warzynski, 2014; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Kranton and Minehart, 2000). 
Table 1 also shows the distribution of movies across genres. The three most common genres 
are Action, Comedy and Drama which account for 21.6%, 22% and 15.5% of the total 
number of movies, respectively. The corresponding figures for total box office revenues in 
                                                          
3
 Results in the robustness checks section indicate that wage gaps using the fixed part of the actor’s salary are 
smaller than those obtained when both fixed and variable compensation is considered.  
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our sample are 30%, 19% and 8% and 47%, 19% and 7% if we only consider movies released 
from 2010 onwards. The increasing importance in the box office of car crashes, special 
effects, superheroes and action in general is driven by the fact that 80% of movie goers these 
days are teenagers. Teenage audiences are the easiest to engage through not only TV 
advertising but also merchandising, tie-dials with fast food restaurants, toy companies, and 
other retailers. Teenagers are also avid consumers of soft drinks, snack foods and popcorn, 
which is the main source of profits for movie theatres. This trend of teenage movie goers is 
also reflected in the fact that 43% of the movies in our sample are recommended for people 
that are 13 and over and thus are classified with a PG-13 rating. 
 
3. Empirical evidence 
3.1. Long-run wages evolution 
Although the above descriptive statistics and the econometric analysis of the paper are 
restricted to the period from 1980 to 2015 due to data availability,
4
 actors’ salary data exists 
in the IMDb which dates back to 1927. These data allow us to have a look at wage trends in 
the very long run. Figure 1 displays the evolution of mean wages in real terms
5
 for the 
extended sample period. It is evident from the figure that, following an early period of 
stagnant wages up to the 1950s, wages have massively increased starting from below one 
million 1983 dollars in 1960, and reaching almost 5 million 1983 dollars in 2015. The 
observed time pattern and the extravagant salaries paid to actors in the most recent period are 
in line with changes in the Hollywood industry.   
First, starting in the 1920s, a ‘studio system’ was in place in Hollywood, which forced actors 
to have exclusive contracts binding them to a specific movie studio for seven years. The fact 
that actors could not renegotiate their contract with the studio within this seven-year period 
implied that studios were enjoying most of the rents. The studio system broke down in the 
(early) 1950s, allowing actors to negotiate contracts on the spot, and thus increasing their 
bargaining power. This development together with the fact that studios widely recognize that 
a film’s production and success crucially depends on the popularity of its casting, may well 
                                                          
4
 Actor’s wage availability before 1980 suffers from a couple of data quality related issues. From 1927 to early-
1979, we observe wages for very good and well established actors at the beginning of their careers. We do not 
consider these observations in our econometric analysis not only due to the fact that they are thin but they 
correspond to wages of top stars and therefore will bias our average mean wages upwards. 
5
 Specifically, our salary measure is gross earnings per movie deflated by the annual consumer price index series 
obtained from Robert Shiller’s website: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
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have resulted in Hollywood actors receiving a larger part of a movie’s revenue (De Vany, 
2004; Elberse, 2007; Epstein, 2012).
6
 Second, Hollywood’s capacity to generate high 
incomes has also been increasing through time. Although revenues from cinema attendance 
have declined since the 1950s, revenues from other sources have increased.
7
 These days, 
studios make billions of dollars from distribution fees, and raise substantial funds from 
investors who are willing to get a tax credit relief both in the US and abroad, hedge funds, 
worldwide theatrical, pre-sales agreements to sell rights to foreign markets, product 
placement agreements with brands, licensing income, and government subsidies (Epstein, 
2012).
8
 Both, the increase in bargaining power of Hollywood actors and the increase in movie 
revenues, can help to explain the stagnant first phase, and the upward trend of the second 
period. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
3.2. Wage inequality 
The fact that average actor earnings have increased substantially over the last decades, does 
not necessarily imply proportional increases in all parts of the wage distribution. Dramatic 
differences exist between high and low earners in Hollywood, and it may well be the case 
that wage inequality has changed over time.   
Figure 2 plots the entire earnings distribution for 2006. As can be clearly seen from the 
figure, the distribution is highly skewed with large differences in earnings between the 
Hollywood stars and the second ranked actors. The share of wages owned by the upper 
quartile of the earnings distribution in 2006 amounts to 68%, whereas the income share 
owned by the bottom quartile accounts for less than 1% of total earnings. Most notably, the 
best ever paid actor in our sample, Tom Cruise, received 75 million dollars in nominal terms 
in 2006 for Mission Impossible III, while the worst paid actor in the same year received 66 
million less (Ryan Gosling in Half Nelson). 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
                                                          
6
 Stars only increase the odds of favourable events that are highly improbable (De Vany, 2004). 
7
 The economic mechanism of how the movie industry makes his money has changed dramatically throughout 
the twentieth century. In Hollywood’s golden age (1920s-1940s) studios owned the major theatre chains and 
were making their profits out of theatre ticket sales. However, weekly cinema attendance has been declining 
since the early 1950s and studios do not make most of their money out of the box office anymore (Moretti, 
2011; Pautz, 2002). 
8
 This licensing includes pay-TV, cable networks, television stations around the world, video stores, DVDs, Blu-
rays, hotels and in-flight entertainment, video games, toy licencing, i-tunes, and other digital downloads. 
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An interesting empirical regularity of the Hollywood industry is that these huge differences in 
earnings among actors can be coupled with small differences in acting skills, which are not 
discernible by the majority of movie goers (Rosen, 1981). In fact, a hierarchy in wages can 
exist even if there are no differences in talent (Adler, 1985). A potential explanation is that 
the large earnings inequality is not driven by talent scarcity but arise due to the way talent is 
discovered in the motion picture industry (Terviö, 2011). Talent, in this case, is industry-
specific and differences in acting skills are only discovered on the job, and once revealed are 
publicly observed. How talent is discovered leads to a market failure in the form of an 
inefficiently low level of output and high wages being paid to ‘superstar’ actors.   
Having looked at wage inequality in earnings of Hollywood actors in a specific year, we now 
proceed to examine how inequality has evolved in the last decades. A priori, one would have 
expected an increase in wage inequality to have taken place following the general trend in the 
US (Piketty and Saez, 2003), and also due to new technologies, which allow movies to be 
distributed to millions of people in the form of DVDs and streaming of online videos. A look 
at Figure 3, which shows the evolution of the income shares (in percentages) of the different 
quartiles of the wage distribution from 1980 to 2015, suggests that this hypothesis is not 
supported by the data. The income share of the top quartile started at around 70%, it declined 
substantially in the mid-2000s to around 50%, and then it remained stable at that level until 
the end of the sample. On the contrary, the share of wages owned by the lowest quartile 
(bottom 25%) remained stable throughout the whole period of study. Thus, it seems that the 
upward trend in actors’ wages that we observe in Figure 1 is driven by the third and second 
quartiles of the earnings distribution which have been gaining through time. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
To shed further light on the wage structure, Figure 4 plots three different measures of 
aggregate wage dispersion. The first illustrates the evolution of the standard deviation of log 
earnings of actors. The second is a measure of changes in overall wage inequality 
summarized by the 75-25 log wage gap in earnings, and the third displays differential 
changes in inequality in the upper half of the wage distribution summarized by the 75-50 log 
wage gap. According to the figure, the earnings ratio between the 75
th
 and 25
th
 percentiles 
from 1980 to 2015 is downward sloping until around the 2000s and then remains constant. In 
the 80s, actors at the 75
th
 percentile of the earnings distribution earned about 7 times as much 
as actors in the 25
th
 percentile. To have an idea of the magnitude, the 90-10 earnings ratio is 
3.2 for economists and 2.4 for high school teachers. This log wage gap decreased by a factor 
8 
 
of three by the early 2000s and from then onwards remained steady. Actors at the 75
th
 
percentile of the earnings distribution earn about 1.5 to 2 times as much as actors in the 50
th
 
percentile. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
A potential concern in the decline in inequality is sample selection, i.e. that our sample is not 
representative of the population of movies. To investigate this possibility, we compare the 
evolution of inequality for box office revenues and for production budgets in our sample with 
a much larger sample (for which actor wages are not available) taken from Box Office Mojo. 
Figure A.1. in the Appendix shows that inequality between movies in terms of box office 
revenues and production budget has been increasing, following a similar pattern, in both 
samples. This suggests that movie-actor pairs do not suffer from biases associated with 
sample selection issues. 
 
3.3. Determinants of wages  
In this section, we move on to examine the determinants of wages in the film industry. In 
order to do this, we start by estimating the following standard earnings equation by OLS: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                             (1) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 is our dependent variable that represents actor i wage for film j in period t, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector which contains actor characteristics in time t such as gender, age, nationality, ethnicity 
and acting experience. It also captures actor’s quality and previous success by including the 
number of Oscar Academy awards the actor has won up to t and the accumulated revenues 
that all movies he/she has acted in have generated up to t. 𝑌𝑗 is a vector which comprises both 
qualitative and quantitative film characteristics, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. The qualitative 
characteristics of films are genre, distributor, whether the movie is a sequel and MPAA 
ratings. The quantitative characteristics of films include production budget, box office 
revenues and number of screens in which the film is projected. 
We adopt an augmented specification procedure which consists of, initially, estimating 
regression (1) using year dummies and the dummy variable female (which captures the 
overall gender wage gap), and then extending the set of regressors sequentially. To draw 
statistical inference, we cluster standard errors at the actor level for all regressions. Table 2 
shows the estimation results. Starting with the baseline model (Column 1), the coefficient 
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estimate on the dummy variable female indicates that female actors earn on average around 
$2.180 million less than male actors (this implies that, on average, females earn 56 percent 
less than males). Although this gap decreases when we include other regressors, it is still 
statistically significant and negative across columns. Specifically, by including actor 
characteristics (Column 2) the wage gap drops to $1.465 million, and by adding the 
qualitative characteristics of movies (Column 4), the wage gap falls further to $1.352 million. 
This is not surprising, given that there is some tendency for women to be concentrated in 
lower-paying movie genres. Finally, when we include actor’s characteristics, and the 
qualitative and quantitative characteristics of movies (Column 7), the wage gap takes the 
value of $1.065 million (which is around 20 percent).  
INSERT TABLE 2 
Turning to the other determinants of wages, an interesting result is that the coefficients on age 
and experience are statistically significant and positive for every specification, and that the 
coefficient for both terms squared is negative. This result indicates that wages increase with 
both age and experience, but there is a point beyond which as actors gain years of experience 
their wages start to decline. With regards to movie-genre, we find that War, Comedy, and 
Action movies tend to pay higher salaries to their cast. Sequels also increase actor’s wages. 
The bargaining power of actors who participated in the first film increases, because there is 
an expectation that a particular actor will continue to play the previous role. Actor’s wages 
are also found to be higher when i) the film has been produced and distributed by one of the 
big six studios, ii) the MPAA rating of the film is PG or PG-13, and iii) the film is successful, 
a blockbuster. The latter finding may be attributed to the higher preliminary expected 
demand: As the number of theatres increases, potential films with an expected high initial 
demand are more likely to end up being a blockbuster
9
 than the rest of films on screens, and 
so predicted successful films will be shown in a higher number of screens as exhibitors 
(Moretti, 2014). Similar results and conclusions can be derived from the production budget 
coefficient. A high budget production is considered a signal of potential success, producers 
spend higher amounts in advertising these movies and so they are more likely to become 
blockbusters. The expected higher revenues translate into higher actors’ wages. 
                                                          
9
 However, several examples can be observed in the film industry across years. See for example Tinker, Taylor, 
Soldier, Spy in 2011 whose demand started to be moderated and it will not be until weeks later, due to word of 
mouth, that audience considerably increased becoming a blockbuster. These types of movies which exceed 
expectations are called in the jargon literature “sleepers or late-burners”. 
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Following previous research, we have examined the importance of Oscar nominations and 
awards (examples include Deuchart et al., 2005; Gumbel et al., 1998, and Nelson et al., 
2011). An Oscar Academy Award is considered a measure of talent in the film industry and is 
expected to have a positive effect on wages. Although our OLS results suggest that Oscar 
awards do not have a significant effect on wages, results from a semi-logarithmic estimation 
suggest that receiving an extra best leading role award increases wages by 36% (coeff 0.358 
and SE 0.127). Wages also increase with high cumulative box office revenues, this can be 
seen as a signal by film producers of the actors’ past success or the potential demand that an 
actor can generate.   
 
3.3.1. Fixed Effects estimation 
In order to examine whether, conditional on the same movie, wages differ between genders 
we extend regression (1) to allow for movie-specific fixed effects:  
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                            (2)  
The results reported in Column 1 of Table 3 show that a female actor earns on average 
around $2.187 million less than a male actor when controlling for individual movie fixed 
effects, a coefficient which is nearly identical to that in the previous Table 2 (-2.180). 
Furthermore, adding extra controls does not reduce substantially the remaining gender 
compensation gap (Columns 2 to 7 in Table 3). For instance, when we include actor 
background characteristics (Column 2) the wage gap drops to $1.516 million, and when we 
include both actor’s characteristics and the qualitative characteristics of movies (Column 4) 
the wage gap becomes $1.527 million. Columns 3 to 6 show that the female dummy variable 
stays unchanged when we add film invariant characteristics such as MPAA ratings and 
number of theatres, respectively. Finally, when we include all the regressors (Column 7), 
again we observe a slight decrease in the wage gap compared to the baseline, but the gap 
remains statistically significant and negative, around -1.092 million. Overall, the above 
results suggest that female and male actors which are similar in terms of talent and past 
success receive differential treatment in terms of compensation within the same movie.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
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3.3.2. Robustness Checks 
We conduct a set of robustness checks by considering i) a dependent variable which includes 
both the fixed and variable parts of an actor’s salary, ii) actor’s salary per minute, to control 
for pre-existing differences in time shooting, iii) cohort specific dummies, and iv) log-level 
regressions. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents estimation results for these new 
specifications using the same set of covariates as in Section 3.3. The main conclusion that 
emerges is that, irrespective of the specification, the gender wage gap differential is negative 
and statistically significant. The most conservative estimate, which corresponds to the log-
level regression with cohort fixed effects and all the covariates, indicates a difference in 
compensation of around 30% between male and female actors that play in the same movie.  
These findings corroborate those of Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008, 2016) for the US. By 
using various imputation rules to take into account selection, the authors obtain a range for 
the median wage gap from 33.4 to 43.2 log points.
10
 
 
3.4. The gender wage gap  
The above empirical findings highlight actor’s gender as one of the main determinants of 
wages. In this section, we focus on the behaviour of the pay differences between male and 
female actors. We first look at summary statistics of gender wage gaps and their evolution 
over time, and then adopt a simple linear regression framework to explore how much of the 
wage gap can be attributed to factors such as experience, gender segregation by movie genre, 
and the under-representation of female actors in blockbusters. 
Table A.2 presents summary statistics for the variables in our sample by gender. The average 
wage (in millions of 1983 dollars) is 4.85 for actors and 2.72 for actresses, resulting in a raw 
wage gap of 2.13 million, and a female to male wage ratio of 0.56. A longitudinal perspective 
is presented in Figure 5, which plots raw male and female average real earnings from 1980 to 
2015. In line with our previous analysis, we can observe that average salaries for both 
genders have been increasing over the last three decades. By comparing the two lines, we 
also see that there is a substantial wage gap, which persists throughout time. The persistence 
of the gender gap in Hollywood is particularly interesting given that the existing literature 
shows that US female to male wage ratios for full time workers have been converging over 
the last decades. Specifically, starting from 62.1% in 1980, wage ratios increased 
                                                          
10
 Blau and Kahn (2016)’s estimated wage gap for the US amounts to 0.47. 
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substantially in the 1980s, reaching 74.0% in 1989, and continued to converge afterwards but 
at a slower rate, reaching 77.2% in 1998 and 79.3% in 2010 (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Blau 
and Kahn, 2006, 2016; Blau, Ferber and Winkler, 2014). 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
Like in Section 3.3, the regression analysis of this section is based on equation (1), and 
utilizes a baseline model which includes year dummies and the gender variable. Results for 
this model are reported in Column 1 of Table 4. Columns 2 to 4 report results for three 
models that extend the baseline by including additional covariates. The first model includes 
age, experience and the square of these two variables; the second incorporates movie-genre 
dummy variables; and the last augments the baseline model with box-office revenues. Data 
for box-office revenues are not available for the entire sample of movies. To permit direct 
comparisons with the baseline, we estimate the baseline using the available subsample, and 
report the results in Column 5. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
With regards to age and experience, female actors are significantly different from their male 
counterparts in our sample. Actresses are, on average, 6 years younger and have 4 fewer 
years of experience (experience is measured as number of years since first movie 
appearance). We expect the relative youth and the lesser labour market experience of 
actresses to be an important determinant of the gender gap. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show 
that this is indeed the case. Controlling for age and experience significantly reduces the 
gender gap coefficient from an original -2.180 to -1.538. That is, these two factors help to 
explain around 29% of the difference in compensation between genders. 
Another potentially important determinant of the wage gap is gender segregation. Evidence 
on occupational sex segregation in other industries suggests that wage levels are substantially 
lower in predominantly female occupations (Killingsworth, 1990; Macpherson and Hirsch, 
1995). Segregation patterns can partly be explained by a gender identity issue by which 
females tend not to participate in some types of occupations that are traditionally male 
dominated (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). Like in other professions, we find that female actors 
also appear not to be allocated randomly across different types of movie genres. Specifically, 
in our sample, only 23.5%, 21%, and 26% of the cast in War, Action and Adventure related 
movies is female, which are the genres where wages are the highest (Table A.3 in the 
13 
 
Appendix).
11
 Looking at the regression results, a comparison of Column 1 and Column 3 
reveals that incorporating genre specific dummies reduces the gender gap coefficient by 11%, 
from -2.180 to -1.934 million.  
As discussed above, actors appear to receive higher wages for blockbuster movies. Column 4 
of Table 4 shows results for the wage gap controlling for total box office revenues, and 
Column 5 presents results for the corresponding baseline model estimated on the available 
subsample of data. We observe that only 7% of the gender gap can be accounted for by the 
differential representation of female actors in Blockbusters.   
In summary, we find that age, experience, and genre segregation play an important role in 
explaining the gender wage gap. On the other hand, we find no evidence of a systematic 
allocation of actresses in low budget movies that leads to substantially lower wages. 
 
3.4.1. Dynamics of the Gender Wage Gap for Actors 
Figure 6 shows the actor and actress mean annual salaries (in million of 1983 dollars) by 
years since first movie appearance. The results show that from the beginning salaries are 
higher for male than for female actors. This difference in wages notably increases from 2 to 3 
years of experience, but after 4 years it starts to converge. Finally, actresses’ salaries overtake 
actors’, but from 17 years of experience wages are again higher for male than for female 
actors. The film industry market is highly competitive, there are thousands of actors and 
actresses trying to get a job but very few of them are demanded by the studios and audiences. 
Furthermore, both male and female actors are sometimes employed not just for their acting 
skills but also for their external appearance. Research from other markets suggests that this 
may make the careers longer for male than for female actors, and so the market dries up 
sooner for poor acting skilled actresses than for equivalent actors (Hamermesh and Biddle, 
1994). However, poor skilled male actors will soon also be removed from the market, and 
after a specific age and length of experience, both male and female actors that remain will be 
the high skilled ones and the ones more demanded by the public and the industry. It is 
possible that at this stage the wage difference begins to converge. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 
                                                          
11
 In Table A.3 in the Appendix, we observe that wages are higher for Oscar nominees, Oscar winners, actors if 
the movie was distributed by one of the Big six studios, and actors if performing in a movie rated as PG-13.  
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In this section, we conduct a dynamic analysis of the gender wage gap as per Bertrand et al., 
(2010) in order to find out whether the gender wage gap disappears and thus wages converge 
with actor’s years of experience. We do this by examining the effect that years of experience 
have on the actor-actress wage gap. Using an OLS methodology we estimate the following 
regression: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1(𝐹𝑖 ∗ 𝐸) +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑌𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                         (3)                                 
where (𝐹𝑖 ∗ 𝐸) represents the interaction between the dummy variable Female and several 
dummy variables that correspond to a set of years of experience dummy variables for actor 
i when acting in film j in period t. 
Table 5 shows the results for equation 3. The first specification shows the results for our 
baseline specification, we observe that the wage gap decreases at a smooth rate with years of 
experience but we are not able to see a convergence (Figure 7). The same can be concluded 
for specifications 3 to 6, indeed the convergence we observed in Figure 6 cannot be seen in 
Table 5 until we include production budget in specification 7, and even then, after 10 years of 
experience the results show that the wage differential decreases but there is still a wage 
differential after 10 years of experience. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
INSERT FIGURE 7 
 
3.4.2. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition  
In the subsequent analysis, we investigate the extent of discrimination against female actors 
by providing a quantitative assessment of the sources of actor-actress wage differences. Our 
measure of discrimination is based on the established Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
(Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). This approach divides the raw wage gap between actors and 
actresses in two components: 
       X-XX actressactoractoractress     
B
actressactor
A
actressactor                                    (4) 
The first component (A) corresponds to the part of the wage differential that is explained by 
group differences in observed characteristics such as years of labour market experience, 
Oscar awards, genre classification and MPAA ratings. The second component (B) 
corresponds to the remaining part that cannot be explained by group differences in wage 
15 
 
determinants. This latter component is thus a measure of discrimination. As can be seen from 
equation (4), the Blinder-Oaxaca discrimination measure may be confounded by differences 
in unobserved variables which are relevant in explaining the actor-actress wage gap. We 
discuss potential factors that can lead to biases in the discrimination measure in the next 
section.  
Panel B of Table 6 shows the results for the Oxaca-Blinder decomposition when movie fixed 
effects are taken into account. Looking at the second specification, where just the actor 
characteristics are included in the regression, differences in endowments account for about 
41% (0.197/0.477) of the wage gap. The remaining 59% of the actor-actress differences in 
wages cannot be explained by differences in observed characteristics. When both actor 
background, and film quantitative and qualitative characteristics are included (specification 
7), 45% of wage differences are unobserved and hence provide evidence which suggests that 
this may reflect some kind of discrimination in the Hollywood labour market. In this paper, 
we are unable to distinguish which part of the estimated discrimination is due to the employer 
or to pre-market characteristics. Supply side factors, which actor gets to read the script, go to 
the castings and more main male roles available are examples of the latter. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
Although we view our unexplained wage gaps of 45% in the movie fixed effects estimations 
as remarkably large magnitudes, if we put these numbers into perspective, they lie between 
the unexplained wage gaps estimated by Blau and Kahn (2016) using the PSID for the US 
population. Specifically, their unexplained wage gaps are 71.4% in 1980 and 85.2% in 2010 
for their human capital model, and 48.5% in 1980 and 38% in 2010 for their full specification 
model.  
 
3.4.2.1. Unobserved Characteristics 
While the unexplained gender compensation gap can be interpreted as evidence for taste 
discrimination against female actors, it could also be due (at least partially) to unobservable 
factors, such as differences in labour market flexibility, and attitudes towards risk and 
competition (see, e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a survey). With regards to labour 
market flexibility, Bertrand et al., (2010) find that females are more affected than males by 
workforce interruptions and shorter hours associated with motherhood. However, Hollywood 
actors do not have a traditional 9 to 5 working day, and are less credit constrained, thus 
16 
 
motherhood penalties are expected to be lower for female actors in comparison to other 
professions.
12
  
Regarding risk and competition preferences, Blau and Kahn (2016) conclude that 
psychological factors do account but only for a small to moderate portion of the economy-
wide gender pay gap. Bertrand (2011) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) show that women are 
less likely than men to engage in competitive interactions such as negotiations (see also 
Rigdon, 2003; Card et al., 2015); and Babcock et al., (2006) show that avoiding negotiations 
can have consequences on pay.  
The literature on personnel economics finds that women are less likely to have jobs with pay 
for performance than men (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Manning and Saidi, 2010). 
This lower likelihood of opting for performance pay is typically attributed to women being 
more risk averse than men (Bertrand, 2011). Our dataset allows us to identify the actors who 
receive variable pay and in turn examine whether females are less likely to be paid on 
performance. We estimate variants of the model in equation (1) where the dependent variable 
is a dummy which takes value 1 if the actor gets any type of variable pay and 0 otherwise. If 
we view the variable part of the salary as performance related pay, the marginal effects from 
a probit model show that females are 4.2 percentage points less likely to be paid based on 
their performance; over a baseline of 0.069, this amounts to female actors being 61% less 
likely to get variable pay.  
In summary, although there may be unobserved characteristics which explain part of the 
gender wage gap in Hollywood, their overall effect is most probably small, and should not 
substantially bias our estimated discrimination measure. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Following recent declarations from well-known female actors in the film industry this paper 
shows evidence of gender discrimination in the industry. The results are important for two 
main reasons, first the film industry is the largest of the creative industries in the US. Second 
it is an industry with a substantial influence on consumer behaviour. The impact of this paper 
not only highlights the current issues regarding superstar payments but also, given the 
exposure of people to the film industry the existence of this discrimination could lead to 
similar practises to be spread across other sectors. 
                                                          
12
 Actors are subject to travel commitments. 
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To analyse wages and wage differentials in the film industry, we use an original dataset 
which comprises data for 267 actors and 1,344 movies from 1980 to 2015. First, we use a 
statistical analysis to shed light on the evolution of wages and the wage structure. We find 
that the labour market for Hollywood actors is characterized by a high level of wages and 
wage inequality.  
Second, we analyse the determinants of wages using an OLS and a movie fixed effects 
methodology, this analysis helps us to identify wage differences between actors and actresses. 
We find that female actors earn on average around 2.2 million dollars less than male actors. 
From this wage differential, sex segregation by movie genre appears to explain around 11% 
of the gender gap. A difference in compensation of 1.065 and 1.092 million dollar still exists 
between male and female actors after we account for actor and movie characteristics, in the 
OLS and movie fixed effects specifications, respectively. This result is remarkably large, 
especially when compared with a study of high-level executives conducted by Bertrand and 
Hallock (2011) but not compared to wage gaps found in the literature for the US population 
(Blau and Kahn, 2016; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016).  
Once the gender wage gap has been identified, we use a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
methodology to investigate the extent of discrimination against female actors. We find that 
the unexplained gender compensation is between 43% (OLS) and 45% (FE) after one 
accounts for all observable differences between male and female actors. This unexplained 
gender compensation gap can be attributed to a taste for labour market discrimination against 
female actors. This discrimination measure is unlikely to suffer from substantial biases since 
gender differences in flexibility and attitudes towards risk and negotiation among the 
population of actors are expected to be smaller than those in the general population.  
Finally, we study male and female actors wage differentials by years since first movie 
appearance in order to analyse whether the gender wage gap disappears with years of 
experience. Our findings carry important implications for pay equity policies that aim to 
narrow the gender wage gap in the Hollywood industry. For instance, making contracts not 
blinded in the film industry and thus providing social information about what other co-stars 
earn can reduce the negotiation gap and therefore the residual wage gap. 
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Figure 1. Actors’ average real wages, 1930-2015 (1983=0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
c
to
rs
' r
e
a
l 
w
a
g
e
s
 (
m
ill
io
n
s
 o
f 
1
9
8
3
 d
o
lla
rs
)
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
22 
 
0
5
1
0
1
5
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
5 10 15 20
lwage
Figure 2. Histogram of Actor’s Earnings for 2006 
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Figure 3. The Wage Income Shares in the Top and Bottom Quartiles, 1980-2015 
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Figure 4. Overall and upper-half Wage Inequality 
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Figure 6.1. Male and Female wages by years since first movie appearance 
 
Figure 6.2. Male and Female wages by years since first movie appearance 
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Figure 7. Estimated Gender Wage Gap by Years since First Movie Appearance 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and variable definitions 
Actor Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Variable definition 
Salary (fixed) 4.09 4.53 
Salary earned independently of 
the film performance. 
ln(Salary) (fixed) 14.27 1.98  
Salary (fixed + variable) 4.38 5.12 
Fixed salary plus % of final box 
office revenues previously agreed 
ln(Salary)(fixed + variable) 14.31 1.99  
Female 0.35 0.47 
Dummy variable: 1=actress; 
0=actor 
Age 36.02 11.29  
Experience 14.20 10.19 
Number of years acting before 
performing in film j 
Race: Asian 0.01 0.11 
Dummy variable: 1=Asian 
background; 0=otherwise 
Race: Black 0.08 0.27 
Dummy variable: 1=Black 
background; 0=otherwise 
Race: Other 0.02 0.13 
Dummy variable: 1=Other 
background; 0=otherwise 
Race: White 0.88 0.32 
Dummy variable: 1=White 
background; 0=otherwise 
Nationality: USA 0.79 0.40 
Dummy variable: 1=USA 
nationality; 0=otherwise 
Oscar: Nomination supportive role 0.17 0.47 
Number of times actor/actress i 
has been nominated to an Oscar 
prize for best supportive role. 
Oscar: Nomination main role 0.33 0.71 
Number of times actor/actress i 
has been nominated to an Oscar 
prize for best leading role. 
Oscar: won main role 0.12 0.37 
Number of times actor/actress i 
has won an Oscar prize for best 
supportive role. 
Oscar: won supporting role 0.06 0.24 
Number of times actor/actress i 
has won an Oscar prize for best 
leading role. 
Won at least 1 Oscar: main role 0.06 0.24 
Dummy variable: 
1=Actor/actress i has won at least 
one Oscar for best leading role 
before acting in film j; 
0=otherwise 
Won at least 1 Oscar: supporting role 0.22 0.41 
Dummy variable: 
1=Actor/actress i has won at least 
one Oscar for best supporting 
role before acting in film j; 
0=otherwise 
At least 1 Oscar nomination: main role 0.14 0.35 
Dummy variable: 
1=Actor/actress i has been 
nominated at least to one Oscar 
for best leading role before acting 
in film j; 0=otherwise 
At least 1 Oscar nomination: supporting role 0.70 0.45 
Dummy variable: 
1=Actor/actress i has been 
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nominated at least to one Oscar 
for best supporting role before 
acting in film j; 0=otherwise 
Accumulative box office revenues 562.69 501.46 
Total revenue accumulated to 
date for a given actor 
Film Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Description 
Genre: Action 0.22 0.41 
Dummy variable: 1=if the genre 
film j is Action; 0=otherwise 
Genre: Adventure 0.05 0.22 
Dummy variable: 1=if the genre 
film j is Adventure; 0=otherwise 
Genre: Comedy 0.22 0.42 
Dummy variable: 1=if the genre 
film j is Comedy; 0=otherwise 
Genre: Crime 0.06 0.24 
Dummy variable: 1=if the genre 
film j is Crime; 0=otherwise 
Genre: Drama 0.15 0.36 
Dummy variable: 1=if the genre 
film j is Drama; 0=otherwise 
Genre: Other 0.16 0.37 
Dummy variable: 1=if the genre 
film j is Other; 0=otherwise 
Genre: Thriller 0.11 0.31 
Dummy variable: 1=if the genre 
film j is Thriller; 0=otherwise 
Genre: War 0.01 0.11 
Dummy variable: 1=if the genre 
film j is War; 0=otherwise 
Sequel 0.10 0.31 
Dummy variable: 1=if film j is a 
sequel; 0=otherwise 
Distributor: big 6 0.70 0.45 
Dummy variable: 1=if film j was 
produced-distributed by one of 
the big 6 Hollywood studios; 
0=otherwise 
MPAA: G 0.01 0.12 
Dummy variable: 1=if film j was 
classified G; 0=otherwise 
MPAA: NC 17 0.01 0.09 
Dummy variable: 1=if film j was 
classified NC-17; 0=otherwise 
MPAA: PG 0.12 0.33 
Dummy variable: 1=if film j was 
classified PG; 0=otherwise 
MPAA: PG 13 0.43 0.49 
Dummy variable: 1=if film j was 
classified PG-13; 0=otherwise 
MPAA: R 0.41 0.49 
Dummy variable: 1=if film j was 
classified R; 0=otherwise 
MPAA: U 0.10 0.30 
Dummy variable: 1=if film j was 
classified U; 0=otherwise 
Total box office revenues 91.88 94.83 Lifetime gross of movie j 
Opening weekend box office revenues 23.63 30.58 First week gross of movie j 
Theatres 2,402.43 1,044.69 
Total number of theatres in which 
movie j was played. 
Production Budget 71.47 50.83 Production budget of movie j 
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Table 2. Determinants of Actors’ Wages, OLS estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Female  -2.180*** -1.465*** -1.323*** -1.352*** -0.983*** -0.942*** -1.065*** 
 (0.434) (0.425) (0.387) (0.382) (0.293) (0.275) (0.350) 
Age   0.274*** 0.270*** 0.258*** 0.305*** 0.300*** 0.277*** 
  (0.063) (0.060) (0.061) (0.053) (0.050) (0.065) 
Age
2
  -0.361*** -0.349*** -0.331*** -0.416*** -0.408*** -0.378*** 
  (0.077) (0.074) (0.073) (0.065) (0.062) (0.078) 
Race: Asian  -1.138* -1.684** -1.508** -1.199 -1.336 -1.276 
  (0.678) (0.655) (0.613) (1.158) (1.164) (1.190) 
Race: Black  0.154 -0.073 -0.031 -0.407 -0.451 -0.706 
  (0.677) (0.669) (0.658) (0.714) (0.682) (0.879) 
Race: Other  -0.961*** -0.451 -0.582* 0.313 0.106 0.364 
  (0.367) (0.359) (0.338) (0.345) (0.343) (0.423) 
Nationality: USA  -0.132 0.038 0.065 -0.093 -0.196 0.012 
  (0.482) (0.466) (0.479) (0.440) (0.413) (0.511) 
Experience   0.309*** 0.288*** 0.290*** 0.113** 0.112** 0.143** 
  (0.061) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.054) (0.064) 
Experience
2
  -0.321*** -0.302*** -0.301*** -0.154*** -0.138** -0.186*** 
  (0.062) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.054) (0.066) 
Genre: Action   1.200*** 1.221*** 1.497*** 1.057** 1.356** 
   (0.447) (0.457) (0.506) (0.518) (0.673) 
Genre: Adventure   1.115* 0.886 1.408** 1.089 1.406* 
   (0.671) (0.695) (0.642) (0.698) (0.828) 
Genre: Comedy   0.826** 0.716** 1.223*** 1.030*** 1.450*** 
   (0.322) (0.325) (0.321) (0.323) (0.398) 
Genre: Crime   0.277 0.727 0.952* 0.890* 1.451* 
   (0.469) (0.467) (0.509) (0.506) (0.755) 
Genre: Drama   0.435 0.573 1.003** 1.436*** 2.216*** 
   (0.429) (0.418) (0.447) (0.440) (0.680) 
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Genre: War   0.965** 1.376*** 1.434*** 1.153*** 1.523*** 
   (0.408) (0.427) (0.402) (0.414) (0.579) 
Genre: Other   2.475* 2.932** 2.803** 2.414* 2.601* 
   (1.380) (1.457) (1.248) (1.226) (1.334) 
Distributor: Big 6   1.331*** 1.060*** 0.664*** 0.307 0.129 
   (0.258) (0.231) (0.210) (0.211) (0.346) 
Sequel   2.450*** 2.343*** 1.812*** 1.405** 1.406* 
   (0.607) (0.592) (0.564) (0.564) (0.772) 
MPAA rating: NC17    -1.068 0.133 1.071  
    (1.235) (1.647) (1.544)  
MPAA rating: PG    0.844 2.381 2.440* 1.429 
    (0.868) (1.480) (1.399) (1.770) 
MPAA rating: PG13    1.272 3.018* 3.095** 2.087 
    (0.877) (1.553) (1.464) (1.813) 
MPAA rating: R    0.109 2.241 2.695* 1.670 
    (0.802) (1.511) (1.421) (1.792) 
Oscar: won main role   0.638 0.634 0.689* 0.715** 0.691 
   (0.509) (0.510) (0.363) (0.347) (0.457) 
Oscar: won supportive role   -0.770 -0.870 -0.231 -0.313 0.056 
   (0.569) (0.604) (0.703) (0.675) (0.792) 
Total box-office revenues     0.005*** 0.000 -0.002 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Accumulative box office revenues     0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Theatres       0.001*** 0.001*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Production budget       0.008 
       (0.006) 
Constant 1.438** -6.110*** -7.438*** -6.676*** -9.299*** -8.556*** -10.504*** 
 (0.563) (1.333) (1.300) (1.962) (2.168) (2.085) (2.492) 
Year fixed effects        
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,338 1,314 1,259 1,251 857 
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R-squared 0.096 0.246 0.302 0.313 0.403 0.421 0.397 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the actor level and appear in 
parentheses. (1) Column 1 includes the dummy variable female. (2) Column 2 adds to Specification (1) actor characteristics. (3) Column 3 adds the qualitative characteristics 
of films and Oscar information except for MPAA ratings. (4) Column 4 adds MPAA ratings to Specification (3). (5) Column 5 includes the quantitative characteristics of 
films except for production budget and actor’s accumulated box office revenues. (6) Column 6 adds production budget to Specification (6). 
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Table 3. Determinants of Actors’ Wages, movie fixed effects estimation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Female  -2.187*** -1.516*** -1.527*** -1.527*** -1.129** -1.129** -1.092** 
 (0.486) (0.509) (0.513) (0.513) (0.451) (0.451) (0.522) 
Age   0.310** 0.321** 0.321** 0.366*** 0.366*** 0.335** 
  (0.140) (0.144) (0.144) (0.132) (0.132) (0.143) 
Age
2
  -0.381** -0.396** -0.396** -0.508*** -0.508*** -0.486*** 
  (0.162) (0.169) (0.169) (0.156) (0.156) (0.169) 
Race: Asian  -3.908** -3.898** -3.898** -3.261* -3.261* -3.207* 
  (1.960) (1.968) (1.968) (1.705) (1.705) (1.767) 
Race: Black  -1.786** -1.787** -1.787** -2.181*** -2.181*** -2.249*** 
  (0.886) (0.890) (0.890) (0.772) (0.772) (0.857) 
Race: Other  0.299 0.291 0.291 1.319 1.319 2.603 
  (1.770) (1.778) (1.778) (1.544) (1.544) (1.853) 
Nationality: USA  1.071* 1.074* 1.074* 0.898 0.898 0.858 
  (0.645) (0.649) (0.649) (0.566) (0.566) (0.628) 
Experience   0.272*** 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.059 0.059 0.097 
  (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.080) (0.080) (0.090) 
Experience
2
  -0.295** -0.294** -0.294** -0.109 -0.109 -0.149 
  (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.113) (0.113) (0.123) 
Oscar: won main role   0.206 0.206 0.824 0.824 0.757 
   (0.785) (0.785) (0.685) (0.685) (0.819) 
Oscar: won supportive role   0.198 0.198 0.573 0.573 0.550 
   (1.252) (1.252) (1.088) (1.088) (1.223) 
Accumulative box office revenues     0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 4.873*** -4.746* -4.885* -4.851* -5.238** -5.222** -4.506 
 (0.205) (2.732) (2.780) (2.780) (2.578) (2.579) (2.819) 
Year fixed effects        
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,338 1,314 1,259 1,251 857 
R-squared 0.075 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.404 0.404 0.406 
Number of movies 1,092 1,092 1,086 1,062 1,015 1,007 650 
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Table 4. Explanations of the gender wage gap 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Female  -2.180*** -1.538*** -1.934*** -2.048*** -2.215*** 
 (0.434) (0.392) (0.406) (0.415) (0.429) 
Age   0.271***    
  (0.063)    
Age
2
  -0.355***    
  (0.077)    
Experience   0.305***    
  (0.062)    
Experience
2
  -0.318***    
  (0.063)    
Genre: Action   2.146***   
   (0.502)   
Genre: Adventure   1.426*   
   (0.791)   
Genre: Comedy   0.987***   
   (0.318)   
Genre: Crime   0.683   
   (0.546)   
Genre: Drama   0.280   
   (0.460)   
Genre: War   1.423***   
   (0.446)   
Genre: Other   3.332**   
   (1.574)   
Total box-office revenues    0.008***  
    (0.002)  
Year fixed effects      
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,338 1,272 1,272 
R-squared 0.096 0.244 0.125 0.122 0.098 
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Table 5. Gender Wage Gap by Years since First Movie Appearance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Female*0-years experience -4.003*** -1.152* -0.598 -0.309 -0.989 -1.117 -0.332 
 (0.742) (0.675) (0.719) (0.950) (0.892) (0.946) (1.575) 
Female*1-year experience -4.995*** -2.483*** -1.926*** -1.585*** -0.628 -0.391 -0.479 
 (0.500) (0.458) (0.482) (0.488) (0.543) (0.713) (0.781) 
Female*2-years experience -4.094*** -1.322* -1.193 -1.172* -0.077 0.100 0.642 
 (0.510) (0.706) (0.736) (0.689) (0.805) (0.810) (1.206) 
Female*3-years experience -4.369*** -2.509*** -1.831*** -1.791*** -1.363*** -1.231*** -1.173** 
 (0.519) (0.599) (0.501) (0.512) (0.430) (0.416) (0.590) 
Female*4-years experience -2.973*** -1.416** -1.018 -1.096* -0.298 -0.324 -1.170 
 (0.691) (0.665) (0.629) (0.651) (0.517) (0.527) (0.743) 
Female*5-years experience -3.765*** -2.838*** -2.645*** -2.631*** -1.593*** -1.632*** -1.899*** 
 (0.523) (0.555) (0.508) (0.506) (0.441) (0.444) (0.690) 
Female*6-years experience -3.231*** -1.352** -1.051* -1.230** -0.546 -0.354 -0.105 
 (0.656) (0.675) (0.567) (0.583) (0.554) (0.533) (0.906) 
Female*7-years experience -3.280*** -2.231*** -2.044*** -1.997*** -1.452*** -1.311*** -1.184** 
 (0.508) (0.526) (0.507) (0.515) (0.410) (0.406) (0.528) 
Female*8-years experience -2.685*** -1.780*** -1.591** -1.763** -1.179* -1.203** -1.362 
 (0.691) (0.686) (0.677) (0.715) (0.614) (0.554) (0.836) 
Female*9-years experience -1.669*** -0.626 -1.142* -1.082 -0.594 -0.436 -0.526 
 (0.595) (0.671) (0.690) (0.682) (0.552) (0.515) (1.048) 
Female*   10-years experience -1.190** -1.193** -1.157** -1.207** -0.894** -0.895** -0.937** 
 (0.473) (0.533) (0.498) (0.493) (0.380) (0.353) (0.441) 
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,338 1,314 1,259 1,251 857 
R-squared 0.121 0.202 0.266 0.277 0.399 0.418 0.392 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the actor level and appear in 
parentheses. All controls as per Table 2.  
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Table 6. Oaxaca decomposition  
Panel A: OLS Total gap Gap due to skill 
differences 
Unexplained gap 
Specification 2 -2.134*** -0.670*** -1.465*** 
 (0.214) (0.140) (0.213) 
Specification 3 -2.153 -0.830 -1.323 
 (0.215) (0.157) (0.200) 
Specification 4 -2.153 -0.801 -1.352 
 (0.217) (0.164) (0.203) 
Specification 5 -2.191 -1.207 -0.983 
 (0.222) (0.181) (0.180) 
Specification 6 -2.219 -1.278 -0.942 
 (0.223) (0.184) (0.178) 
Specification 7 -2.499 -1.434 -1.065 
 (0.289) (0.243) (0.242) 
Panel B: movie 
specific fixed effects 
Total gap Gap due to skill 
differences 
Unexplained gap 
Specification 2 -0.477 -0.197 -0.280 
 (0.091) (0.062) (0.087) 
Specification 3 -0.479 -0.197 -0.281 
 (0.091) (0.063) (0.087) 
Specification 4 -0.489 -0.201 -0.288 
 (0.093) (0.064) (0.089) 
Specification 5 -0.481 -0.257 -0.225 
 (0.095) (0.075) (0.081) 
Specification 6 -0.484 -0.258 -0.226 
 (0.095) (0.075) (0.082) 
Specification 7 -0.602 -0.333 -0.269** 
 (0.131) (0.111) (0.117) 
Note: The specifications correspond to column numbers in Tables 2 and 3.  
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Appendix 
Figure A.1. Overall inequality in box office revenues and production budgets 
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Table A.1. Estimates of the gender wage gap, movie fixed effects 
Panel A  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Wage (fixed) Female -2.187*** -1.516*** -1.527*** -1.527*** -1.129** -1.129** -1.092** 
  (0.486) (0.509) (0.513) (0.513) (0.451) (0.451) (0.522) 
 Obs 1,344 1,344 1,338 1,314 1,259 1,251 857 
 R-sq 0.075 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.404 0.404 0.406 
 #movies 1,092 1,092 1,086 1,062 1,015 1,007 650 
Wage (fixed per minute) Female -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.010** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Obs 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,272 1,259 1,251 857 
 R-sq 0.076 0.255 0.256 0.256 0.411 0.411 0.409 
 #movies 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,022 1,015 1,007 650 
Wage (fixed & variable) Female -2.839*** -2.177*** -2.175*** -2.175*** -1.731*** -1.731*** -1.862*** 
  (0.586) (0.619) (0.624) (0.624) (0.574) (0.574) (0.675) 
 Obs 1,344 1,344 1,338 1,314 1,259 1,251 857 
 R-sq 0.086 0.228 0.229 0.229 0.358 0.358 0.356 
 #movies 1,092 1,092 1,086 1,062 1,015 1,007 650 
Wage (fixed) Female -1.389** -1.617*** -1.600*** -1.600*** -0.917* -0.917* -1.080 
Cohort fixed effects  (0.558) (0.581) (0.586) (0.586) (0.546) (0.546) (0.663) 
 Obs 1,344 1,344 1,338 1,314 1,259 1,251 857 
 R-sq 0.466 0.532 0.535 0.535 0.611 0.611 0.630 
 #movies 1,092 1,092 1,086 1,062 1,015 1,007 650 
Panel B         
Log Wage (fixed) Female -0.745*** -0.439*** -0.444*** -0.444*** -0.341** -0.341** -0.423*** 
  (0.147) (0.153) (0.154) (0.154) (0.147) (0.147) (0.152) 
 R-sq 0.093 0.257 0.258 0.258 0.354 0.354 0.361 
Log Wage  
(fixed per minute) 
Female -0.735*** -0.416*** -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.341** -0.341** -0.423*** 
  (0.148) (0.154) (0.155) (0.155) (0.147) (0.147) (0.152) 
 R-sq 0.090 0.265 0.267 0.267 0.354 0.354 0.361 
Log Wage  Female -0.793*** -0.489*** -0.493*** -0.493*** -0.388** -0.388** -0.482*** 
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(fixed & variable)  (0.149) (0.155) (0.157) (0.157) (0.150) (0.150) (0.155) 
 R-sq 0.101 0.263 0.264 0.264 0.359 0.359 0.366 
Log Wage (fixed) Female -0.442*** -0.429** -0.420** -0.420** -0.223 -0.223 -0.302 
Cohort fixed effects  (0.164) (0.174) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.186) 
 R-sq 0.505 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.589 0.589 0.630 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the actor level and appear in 
parentheses. (1) Column 1 includes the dummy variable female and year dummies. (2) Column 2 adds to Specification (1) actor characteristics. (3) Column 3 adds the 
qualitative characteristics of films and Oscar information except for MPAA ratings. (4) Column 4 adds MPAA ratings to Specification (3). (5) Column 5 includes the 
quantitative characteristics of films except for production budget and actor’s accumulated box office revenues. (6) Column 6 adds production budget to Specification (6). 
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Table A.2. Descriptive statistics by gender 
 Males Females 
 Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Salary  4.853 5.121 2.719 2.721 
Age  38.329 11.784 31.867 8.979 
Experience  15.696 11.165 11.51 7.437 
Race: Asian 0.012 0.107 0.0145 0.12 
Race: Black 0.107 0.31 0.039 0.195 
Race: Other 0.006 0.076 0.044 0.205 
Race: White 0.875 0.331 0.902 0.297 
Nationality: USA 0.744 0.437 0.887 0.316 
Oscar: nomination supporting role 0.15 0.452 0.221 0.518 
Oscar: nomination main role 0.384 0.768 0.245 0.597 
Oscar: won main role 0.116 0.376 0.129 0.376 
Oscar: won supporting role 0.063 0.242 0.062 0.242 
Actor’s accumulative box office  650.835 558.848 403.640 320.483 
Genre: Action 0.267 0.442 0.127 0.334 
Genre: Adventure 0.059 0.236 0.037 0.19 
Genre: Comedy 0.211 0.408 0.251 0.434 
Genre: Crime 0.061 0.238 0.061 0.238 
Genre: Drama 0.139 0.347 0.183 0.387 
Genre: Other 0.144 0.352 0.198 0.399 
Genre: Thriller 0.104 0.304 0.134 0.341 
Genre: War 0.015 0.122 0.008 0.091 
Distributor: big 6 0.716 0.451 0.683 0.465 
Sequel 0.113 0.317 0.088 0.283 
MPAA: G 0.012 0.107 0.023 0.152 
MPAA: NC 17 0.013 0.113 0.004 0.065 
MPAA: PG 0.126 0.332 0.124 0.329 
MPAA: PG 13 0.422 0.494 0.456 0.498 
MPAA: R 0.428 0.495 0.392 0.488 
Total box office revenues 98.871 98.096 79.086 87.218 
Opening weekend box office 25.541 31.821 20.138 27.866 
Theatres 2,460.53 1,036.716 2,295.96 1,052.004 
Production budget 77.018 52.096 60.843 46.579 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
Table A.3. Average wage by categories 
Actor Characteristics mean (salary) sd (salary) 
Male 4.85 5.12 
Female 2.72 2.72 
Race: Asian 3.17 3.19 
Race: Black 4.37 4.17 
Race: White 4.1 4.61 
Race: Other 2.91 2.81 
Nationality: USA 4.11 4.66 
Nationality: Other 4.03 3.97 
Oscar won: main role 0 3.9 4.52 
Oscar won: main role 1 5.42 3.74 
Oscar won: main role 2 7.3 6.23 
Oscar won: supportive role 5.32 3.66 
Oscar nomination: main role 0 3.32 3.53 
Oscar nomination: main role 1 6.83 6.31 
Oscar nomination: main role 2 7.7 6.87 
Oscar nomination: main role 3 4.99 4.61 
Oscar nomination: supportive role 0 3.94 4.51 
Oscar nomination: supportive role 1 5.2 4.85 
Oscar nomination: supportive role 2 2.76 1.92 
Oscar nomination: supportive role 3 5.31 3.02 
Won at least 1 Oscar: main role 5.76 4.31 
Won at least 1 Oscar 5.32 3.66 
Nomination at least 1 Oscar: main role 6.8 6.29 
Nomination at least 1 Oscar: supportive role 4.95 4.59 
Film Characteristics mean (salary) sd (salary) 
Genre: Action 5.43 5.62 
Genre: Adventure 4.69 4.59 
Genre: Comedy 3.98 3.74 
Genre: Crime 3.73 4.07 
Genre: Drama 3.18 4.73 
Genre: Thriller 4.48 4.3 
Genre: War 7.11 6.95 
Genre: Other 2.79 2.95 
Distributor: Big Six 4.61 4.82 
Distributor: Other 2.84 3.45 
Sequel 5.73 6.14 
No Sequel 3.90 4.27 
Rating: G 1.96 2.84 
Rating: NC17 0.21 0.36 
Rating: PG 3.32 3.86 
Rating: PG13 4.99 5.15 
Rating: R 3.66 3.95 
 
